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CONTINUED EXPANSION OF CORPORATE SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY IN THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY ARENA
Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc.
86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981)
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Ramirez v. Amsted Industries,
Inc.,' recently addressed the turbulent issue of corporate successor re-
sponsibility for defective products. Traditionally, a corporate successor
was not held responsible for injuries caused by the defective products
manufactured and sold by its predecessor. 2 Several judicial exceptions,
however, were created to allow for the imposition of successor liability
in certain situations.3 These exceptions have been narrowly applied in
the past and are available to the injured products liability plaintiff only
on rare occasions. 4 This traditional corporate rule has been severely
criticized as very harsh and not responsive to the public policies under-
lying strict products liability.- In response, many courts have expanded
the traditional rule in order to absorb many of the claims presented by
products liability plaintiffs. 6 Other courts have substantially altered the
traditional rule in treating products liability claims differently, in-
dependent of any notions reflecting corporate law.7
The Ramirez court joined ranks with those courts opting for a
complete overhaul of the traditional rule in dealing with products lia-
1. 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981). Decided along with Ramirez was the companion case
of Nieves v. Bruno-Sherman, 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 800 (W.D.
Mich. 1974).
3. See, e.g., Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128, 131 (D.N.J. 1976); Her-
nandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 111. App. 3d 664, 667, 388 N.E.2d 778, 780 (1979).
4. Eg., Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 Ill. App. 3d 664, 388 N.E.2d 778 (1979);
McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), aff'dfper curiam, 118 N.J.
Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (1972).
5. See Note, Products Liability-Corporations-Asset Sales and Successor Liability, 44
TENN. L. REV. 905 (1977); Note, The Extension ofProducts Liability To Corporate Asset Transfer-
ees-An Assault On Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 584 (1977); Comment, Extension Of
Strict Tort Liability To Successor Corporations, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 595 (1978); Comment, Cyr v. B.
Offen & Co.: Liability OfBusiness Transferees For Product Injuries, 27 MAINE L. REV. 305 (1975).
6. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (lst Cir. 1974); Knapp v. North American
Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel
Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super.
476, 356 A.2d 458 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 94-104 infra.
7. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3 (1977); Turner v. Bitumi-
nous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 105-23
infra.
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bility claims. In doing so, the court adopted the "product line ap-
proach" first presented by the Supreme Court of California in Ray v.
Alad Corp. ,8 which extended products liability to the corporate succes-
sor where the successor continued to manufacture the same product
line of its predecessor. The Ramirez court was forced to address some
questions regarding the fairness of imposing liability upon a business
both completely free of fault and without any capacity to prevent the
injury.9 Furthermore, the court added a new dimension to this area of
law by giving its ruling a retroactive effect, in furtherance of the pur-
poses of strict products law.' 0 This new dimension will undoubtedly
have an impact upon judicial decision-making in the products liability
arena. " I
This comment will review the development of corporate successor
liability and will trace its gradual expansion in response to the needs of
the products liability plaintiff. It will then trace the liberal develop-
ment of tort law principles, which reflect a movement toward the era of
"enterprise liability." This liberal development toward enterprise lia-
bility concepts will be synthesized with a discussion of Ray v. A/lad
Corp. 12 and Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. ,'3 the two landmark de-
cisions that signaled a major change in the law of corporate successor
responsibility. A discussion and analysis of the Ramirez decision will
8. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3 (1977). See notes 105-12 and accompanying
text infra for a discussion of the product line approach.
9. The facts in Ramirez indicate that Johnson Machine and Press Co. manufactured a defec-
tive power press in 1948 or 1949. This press allegedly caused serious injury in 1975. However,
Amsted could not have prevented the defective manufacture, because it had not taken over the
Johnson product line until 1962. See 86 N.J. at 333, 431 A.2d at 813. See also text accompanying
notes 125-34 infra.
10. A rule emanating from a case is considered as being given a retroactive application when
it is applied in such a manner as to have a legal effect upon conduct which has occurred prior to
the announcement of the new rule. Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371, 1377 (1966). By contrast, a case is
regarded as being given a prospective application when the new rule derived from that case only
applies to conduct that occurs after the announcement of the new rule. Id The justification for
retroactive, or retrospective, decision-making is based upon Blackstonian jurisprudence, which
traditionally held that appellate judges do not espouse or create new law, rather they maintain and
expound law that has always existed. I BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES *69. Therefore,
a later judicial decision which seems to change the law has not really changed it at all but
has only discovered the "true" rule which was always the law. It follows that any judi-
cial "change" in the law must necessarily be retroactive. It could not be otherwise, for
the judge is deemed merely to be articulating what the law has always been.
Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1960). Prospective
decision-making, on the other hand, is frequently employed to avoid undue hardship to parties
that have maintained their conduct in conformity with the existing law. Traynor, Transatlantic
Reflections on Leeways and Limits of Appellate Courts, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 255, 265-66 [hereinafter
Traynor].
11. See text accompanying notes 194-95 infra.
12. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3 (1977).
13. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
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then follow. In addition, this comment will assess the Ramirez court's
responses to this troubling area of the law. Finally, this comment will
reveal how a retroactive application of the Ramirez decision furthers
the purposes of strict products liability.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Successor Liability Under Corporate Law
A "successor," in a very broad sense, can be defined as "one who
takes the place that another has left, and sustains the like part or char-
acter; one who takes the place of another by succession."' 4 Although
there is no specific definition of a "corporate successor," it is clear that
one corporation can "succeed" another corporation in any number of
ways.15 Nevertheless, a "successor" in the corporate arena is an entity
that has assumed the rights and obligations of another corporation by
amalgamation, consolidation, or any other legally authorized method
of acquisition. 16 However, this simple definition of "corporate succes-
sor" gives no hint as to the basis of corporate successor liability. For
this reason, an analysis of the theories of corporate successor liability
will be discussed below.
Traditionally, the liability of a successor corporation has been gov-
erned by the law of corporations.' 7 Under corporate law, the general
rule holds that where one entity "sells or otherwise transfers all of its
assets to another company the latter is not liable for the debts and lia-
bilities of the transferor, including those arising out of the latter's tor-
tious conduct."' 8  Courts commonly refer to this principle as the
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1283 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). See City of New York v. Turnpike
Development Corp., 36 Misc. 2d 704, 706, 233 N.Y.S.2d 887, 890 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
15. The transfer of an ongoing business concern can be accomplished in one of three ways:
I. by statutory merger or consolidation; 2. through the purchase of the stock of a target corpora-
tion; and 3. through the purchase of assets of the target corporation. D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS
PLANNING 679-80 (1966). It should be noted that the form of the acquisition will determine
whether a corporate successor will assume the existing and contingent obligations of its predeces-
sor. See Note, Products Liability. Developments in the Rule of Successor Liabilityfor Product-
Related Injuries, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 338, 346-50 (1979). However, acquisition through the
purchase of a target corporation's assets is especially advantageous, because the purchaser will be
responsible only for those liabilities that he expressly or impliedly assumes. Id at 349-50.
16. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 328 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959).
17. See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Hernandez v. Johnson
Press Corp., 70 I11. App. 3d 664, 388 N.E.2d 778 (1979); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J.
Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970).
18. Department of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 453, 419 A.2d 1151,
1154 (1980). See also Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Freeman v. White Way Sign & Maintenance Co., 82 Ill.
App. 3d 884, 893, 403 N.E.2d 495, 501 (1980).
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"general rule of nonliability."19 The rule is obviously intended to limit
the liability of successor corporations under several circumstances 20
and flows from the notion that the law does not compel the purchaser
of a business to assume the liability that his predecessor has incurred.21
But the general rule of nonliability is not all-encompassing. Judi-
cially created limitations have been placed upon the rule in the form of
four exceptions. 22 The purchasing corporation may be held responsible
for the liabilities of the seller where:
1. The purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to as-
sume the debts and liabilities of the selling corporation.
23
2. The transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger. 24
3. The purchasing corporation is merely a continuance of the sell-
ing corporation.
25
4. The transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape
19. Eg., Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 I11. App. 3d 664, 668, 388 N.E.2d 778, 780
(1979); Department of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 453, 419 A.2d 1151,
1154 (1980); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 436, 244 N.W.2d 873, 886 (1976)
(dissenting opinion).
20. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text infra.
21. See generally 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 7122 (rev. ed. 1973) [hereinafter FLETCHER].
22. See generally Comment, Extension of Strict Tort Liability to Successor Corporations, 61
MARQ. L. REV. 595, 598-99 (1978), for a discussion of the exceptions to the general rule of
nonliability.
23. Typically, courts will look to the terms of the purchase agreement in determining whether
certain liabilities were expressly or impliedly assumed by the purchaser. See, e.g., Gee v. Ten-
neco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1980); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 847-
48, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 557-58 (1975); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super, 555, 561-63,
264 A.2d 98, 101-03 (1970), a§'dper curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (1972). However,
in some cases obligations of the predecessor were impliedly assumed from the acquisition of the
predecessor's business and continuation of the operations. See Bouton v. Litton Indus. Inc., 423
F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1970); Pearce v. Schneider, 242 Mich. 28, 217 N.W. 761 (1928).
24. Very simply, a'merger of two corporations occurs where one corporation is absorbed by
another and goes out of existence, but the absorbing corporation remains; whereas, in a consolida-
tion both corporations go out of existence and an entirely new corporate entity takes the place of
the former corporations. Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 485, 356
A.2d 458, 463 (1976). This exception is sometimes referred to as the "de facto merger." Eg. Gee
v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1980); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th
Cir. 1977); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873, 887 (1976) (dissenting
opinion).
25. The mere continuation exception is probably the most confusing and misunderstood of
the four exceptions. Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 448-49, 244 N.W.2d 873, 892
(1976) (dissenting opinion). However, many courts have held that one corporation is a mere con-
tinuation of another where there is a common identity of stockholders, officers and directors be-
tween the seller and purchaser. See Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821-22 (D.
Colo. 1968); Lopata v. Bemis Co., 383 F. Supp. 342, 345 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Wilson v. Fare Well
Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 485, 356 A.2d 458, 464 (1976). Thus, "for liability to attach, the
purchasing corporation must represent merely a 'new hat' for the seller." Turner v. Bituminous
Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 450, 244 N.W.2d 873, 893 (1976) (dissenting opinion); McKee v. Harris-
Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 570, 264 A.2d 98, 106 (1970), affdper curiam, 118 N.J. Super,
480, 288 A.2d 585 (1972). This concept is actually nothing more than a corporate reorganization.
See FLETCHER, supra note 21, § 7122.
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liability.26
In addition, a fifth exception, sometimes incorporated as an element of
one of the above exceptions, has been invoked in the absence of ade-
quate consideration.27 Even though the exceptions appear to be perva-
sive, they were given a very limited application. 28  This was due, in
part, to a strong judicial emphasis upon the freedom of commercial
activity and right to contract.29 Furthermore, these exceptions applied
with equal force to either stock or asset acquisitions.
30
These limitations upon successor nonliability were initiated in re-
sponse to concerns within the business community. Specifically, the ex-
ceptions were developed to protect creditors, 3' dissenting
stockholders, 32 and to determine liability in tax assessment cases. 33 This
26. Courts have characterized numerous types of business transactions as fraudulent trans-
fers. See Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 824, 850-53 (1975); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 881, 884-99 (1973). For
example, a transfer is considered fraudulent where the consideration is paid directly to the selling
company's shareholders rather than to the corporation itself. See, e.g., Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 85
Nev. 276, 454 P.2d 24 (1969); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 881, 895-98 (1973). Another fraudulent con-
veyance occurs where the purchasing corporation had knowledge of the fact that the selling corpo-
ration intended to default on its debts. See, e.g., City of Altoona v. Richardson Gas & Oil Co., 81
Kan. 717, 106 P. 1025 (1910). See generally I G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND
PREFERENCES § 324 (rev. ed. 1940).
27. See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1974);
Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128, 131 (D.N.J. 1976); McKee v. Harris-Seybold
Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 561-62, 264 A,2d 98, 102 (1970), af'dper curiam, 118 N.J. Super, 480,
288 A.2d 585 (1972). See also FLETCHER, supra note 21, §§ 7122-24; 19 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations
§ 1546 (1965). Typically, transfers for inadequate consideration are characterized as a fraudulent
attempt to escape liability. See, e.g., Economy Refining & Service Co. v. Royal National Bank, 20
Cal. App. 3d 434, 97 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1971); Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 100 N.J. Super.
186, 241 A.2d 471 (1968).
28. Juenger & Schulman, Assets Sales And Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 39, 45-46
(1975). In fact, the general rule of nonliability, with its exceptions, has acted as a security blanket
for corporate successors, protecting them from the unknown or contingent liabilities of the prede-
cessor. See, e.g, Oak Distributing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 370 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Mich. 1973);
National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Borden Co., 363 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Bazan v. Kux
Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842,
120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975); Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 92 Cal. Rptr.
776 (1971).
29. See Kadens, Practitioner's Guide to Treatment ofSeller's Products Liabilities in Assets Ac-
quisitions, 10 TOL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1978). The freedom to contract is linked to the notion that a bona
fide purchaser of property has a right to make such a purchase free of any unknown or unassumed
claims against that property. See FLETCHER, supra note 21, § 7122 n. 1 for cases espousing this
principle.
30. In this respect, the limitations upon the general rule of nonliability supplement the rule
which previously held the asset purchaser responsible for only those liabilities he expressly or
impliedly assumes. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. See also Note, Products Liabil-
ity. Developments In The Rule of Successor Liability/or Product-Related Injuries, 12 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 338, 347-51 (1979).
31. See Note, Assumption oProducts Liability In Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86,
91 (1975); Comment, Products Liability-Corporations-Asset Sales and Successor Liability, 44
TENN. L. REV. 905, 908 (1977).
32. Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146, a 'd, 33
N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
broad rule and its narrow limits became firmly entrenched in the
American judiciary long before the concept of strict products liability
had even reached an embryonic stage.3 4 Thus, it is not surprising that
the public policies behind products liability received no attention in the
evolution of traditional corporate successor liability.
The Development Of Tort Law. A More Liberal Attitude Toward The
Injured Plaintiff
At the same time the traditional corporate rule of successor liabil-
ity became more firmly entrenched in the American judiciary, some
dynamic changes in the area of tort law began to emerge. 35 The most
notable of these changes was the adoption of the concept of strict prod-
ucts liability.36 This movement into the strict liability arena was not as
significant as it appears on the surface because, as we will see, the doc-
trine of strict products liability was more of a response to the changing
emphasis in tort law rather than a total abrogation of existing tort prin-
ciples.37 For this reason, it is critical to first examine the changing theo-
ries in tort law before proceeding to evaluate the underpinnings of
strict products liability.
In a very broad sense, the development of modem tort law can
best be presented through a brief analysis of three distinct theories of
tort liability that have pervaded the common law. A chronological dis-
cussion of each of the three evidences a gradual change in the underly-
ing emphasis of tort liability.38 Generally speaking, the American
judiciary has continually expanded tort liability to increase the likeli-
hood that an injured plaintiff will be fully compensated for harm
caused by wrongful conduct. This focus is the principle reason for the
33. West Texas Refining & Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1933).
34. The traditional corporate rule regarding corporate successor liability was firmly estab-
lished as the majority rule in the United States even before the concept of strict products liability
was first adopted by the Supreme Court of California in 1963. Compare FLETCHER, Supra note 21,
§ 7122, with Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1962).
35. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (elimina-
tion of the privity concept with regard to products liability). See also Prosser, The Assault Upon
The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099-1115 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Prosser, Assault].
36. The doctrine of strict products liability was first adopted by the California Supreme
Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1962).
37. See Schwartz, Forward- Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435, 435-48
(1979); Klemne, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COL. L. REV. 153 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Klemme].
38. See infra text accompanying notes 39-62.
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more liberal attitude toward expanding tort liability in the twentieth
century.
The oldest, and conceptually the most difficult, theory of tort lia-
bility was the theory of force. 39 Under the force theory, "[t]he only
limitations on the imposition of liability are that the defendant must
have voluntarily intended to do the act which caused the injury, and
the act must have been a fairly 'direct' cause of the injury."' 40 Thus, the
cornerstone of liability was the defendant's voluntary intent to commit
an affirmative act coupled with the direct cause of injury.4' The appli-
cation of these criteria to actual cases was, as a practical matter, very
difficult and confusing.42 However, it is clear that an application of the
force theory in many situations was egregiously unfair to the injured
plaintiff. For example, "by requiring an affirmative act, the force the-
ory did not normally result in the imposition of liability when the con-
duct of the defendant was in the form of an omission, ' 43 because an
omission was not an affirmative act.
By the late 1800's another concept of tort liability gained accept-
ance in American courts-the fault theory of liability.44 The fault the-
ory discarded the perplexing requirements mandated by the force
theory and, instead, focused on the necessity of deterring socially unde-
sirable behavior.45 Thus, a defendant would be held liable for those
injuries proximately caused by his or her socially undesirable con-
duct.46 The "fault" concept is more commonly known to all legal prac-
titioners as the law of negligence and is still entrenched in the common
law today. 47 Imposing the stricter negligence standards upon the de-
fendant's conduct made it much easier for the plaintiff to recover from
the culpable defendant for his injuries.48 However, the fault theory was,
39. See Klemme, supra note 37, at 166. See also 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 90-92
(1881).
40. Klemme, supra note 37, at 166-67. See I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 1.4 (1956); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 13 at 63-66 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
41. See Klemme, supra note 37, at 167.
42. It was the application of the "direct cause" requirement of the force theory which ulti-
mately caused such difficulties. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 90-92 (1881).
43. Klemme, supra note 37, at 168.
44. See A. EHRENZWIEG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 9-14 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
EHRENZWEIG]; Klemme, supra note 37, at 170-73.
45. See PROSSER, supra note 40, § 4 at 23; James,Accident Liability Reconsidered The Impact
of Liabiliy Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 557 (1948).
46. Actually, the fault theory was employed before the concept of proximate cause was first
introduced by Justice (then Judge) Cardozo in the landmark decision of Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See Klemme, supra note 37, at 170-71.
47. See generally PROSSER, supra note 40, 16-21, 492-94.
48. This is so because the "[fault] theory, unlike the force theory, allowed the law to take into
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and still is, internally inconsistent in many respects.49 Furthermore,
many courts eagerly expanded tort liability upon a defendant whose
conduct could not be characterized as "negligent." One such example
was the employer's liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
50
Such an expansion of liability actually contradicts the basis of the fault
theory, i e., the responsibility for injuries proximately caused by the
defendant's negligent conduct. For this reason, some commentators
have suggested that courts have actually employed strict tort principles
under the cloak of negligence law.
5'
This ever-expanding reach of tort liability under the fault theory
further facilitated the injured plaintiff's ability to pursue recovery from
the defendant. But more importantly, the expansion was evidence of a
trend away from the concept of fault and closer to a new concept of
liability-the enterprise theory.52  The basic philosophy of the enter-
prise liability theory is that injuries from accidents are losses to society,
losses which should be borne by the enterprise or activity which created
account omissions as well as commissions." Klemme, supra note 37, at 170. In this critical re-
spect, the fault theory differed substantially from the force theory in that the former theory
continued to hang on tenaciously to the fault idea in the sense of causal fault, that is,
"It's his fault. He caused it." "Fault," for the fault theory, however, means not only that
the defendant caused it, but he caused it by "faulty" behavior-behavior which was itself
socially undesirable.
Id
49. For example, the primary function of fault theory is two-fold: to deter similar conduct in
the future and to compensate the injured plaintiff ("make the plaintiff whole"). See EHRENZWIEG,
supra note 44, § 10 at 38-41. Yet, these two goals are in conflict with each other, because "[tihe
attempt is to compensate the plaintiff for one set of reasons, and to punish the defendant for an
entirely different set of reasons, by the single act of making the defendant pay a sum of money to
the plaintiff." Id. at 39 n. 140, quoting Morris, Rough Justice and Some Utopian Ideas, 24 ILL. L.
REV. 730, 733 (1930). The divergence between these two functions was made patently clear by one
author who said that the
internal inconsistency between the fault theory and its deterrence rationale lies in the
rule allowing a tortfeasor to insure against the actual damages he may incur as a result of
having engaged in faulty, tortious conduct. Of course, to the extent one suffers an in-
crease in his liability insurance premiums and he knows the increase is the result of his
tortious conduct, some specific, and possibly general, deterrence can be expected. But
because the economic impact of an increase in insurance rates on any one insured is
almost always likely to be less than the amount of any tort judgment, the amount of
individual deterrence achieved by imposing this financial burden on the actor is likely to
be substantially diminished.
Klemme, supra note 37, at 173 (footnotes omitted).
50. See EHRENZWIEG, supra note 44, at 18-19. Of course, the expansion of fault liability
spread into a multitude of other areas with equal fervor. See id at 48-52. See also Prosser, As-
sault, supra note 35, at 1099-1114.
51. See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 44, at 48-52. See generally, Prosser, Assault, supra note 35.
This practice by courts prompted at least one author, more than thirty years ago, to suggest that
the true rule of tort law is a form of strict liability called "negligence without fault."
EHRENZWIEG, supra note 44, at 47.
52. See Klemme, supra note 37.
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that risk and ultimately caused the injury, regardless of fault. 53 The
focus of enterprise liability is upon two factors. First, the manufacturer
is in the best position to absorb and spread the costs of injuries which
are the inevitable results of its manufacturing enterprise. 54 Further-
more, the manufacturer is also in the best position to prevent the risks
of injury posed by its enterprise. 5 In this manner, imposing liability in
such a wide range of circumstances acts as an economic incentive for
the manufacturer to increase his efforts to reduce the risks of injury.
56
The ultimate goal of enterprise liability is to obtain the maximum
prevention of serious harm which is economically feasible.57 Thus the
underlying assumption is that the ultimate risks inherent in a given in-
dustry can best be prevented and accounted for by imposing the initial
responsibility for those risks upon the manufacturers in that industry. 58
Stated very simply, enterprise liability places the entire economic bur-
den upon the manufacturer because he is the best risk preventer and
the best cost allocator.59
The enterprise theory is actually an outgrowth of the advances and
innovations of industrialized society. 60 Along with the greater techno-
logical capabilities came dramatic increases in the risk of serious per-
manent harm. As a result, society gradually demanded that the vast
growth in industry's wealth carried with it a commensurate responsibil-
ity for protection against the risk of harm.6' This ultimately developed
53. See, e.g., Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172,
1173 (1952); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 382-83, 386
(1951); James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability. The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27
N.Y.U.L. REV. 537, 538 (1952). This concept has also been referred to as the "deep pocket"
theory of liability. See, e.g., Calabresi, Some Thoughts On Risk Distribution And The Law Of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 527-28 (1961).
54. See, e.g., EHRENZWIEG, supra note 44, at 16-17; Calabresi, Some Thoughts On Risk Distri-
bution And The Law Of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517-19 (1961); Prosser, Assault, supra note 35, at
1120-21.
55. Klemme, supra note 37, at 186-90.
56. Id at 189.
57. Id at 188.
58. Id at 186-87.
59. Id at 188.
60. EHRENZWIEG, supra note 44, at 16-17.
61. Id Professor Ehrenzweig synthesized the effect of the industrial revolution when he
wrote:
A development towards a stricter liability cannot be observed until the second half of the
nineteenth century. That development was apparently due to a certain sentiment of hos-
tility against innovations caused by the increase of industrial risks and financial failures;
to the humanitarian demand for broader protection in a more social minded era; and
finally to the fact that the growing industrial wealth and stability, coupled with a spread-
ing system of liability insurance, made it easier to dispense with the injurer's protection
afforded by a liability law primarily based on fault. It became more and more apparent
that it was "socially expedient to spread and distribute throughout the community the
inevitable losses."
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into a belief that the costs of preventing and compensating for injuries
was an obligation that one assumed by going into business.62 Greater
increases in manufacturer responsibility once again meant that the in-
jured plaintiff would have a much easier opportunity to recover from a
culpable defendant.
PUBLIC POLICIES UNDERLYING STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The trend towards the theory of enterprise liability was paralleled
by the corresponding development of the law of products liability.63 In
1842, the court in Winterbottom v. Wright 64 denied recovery to the pas-
senger in a defective carriage because he lacked privity of contract with
the manufacturer. 65 However, not long after the turn of the century,
the narrow position taken by the Winterbottom court was rejected by
Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. ,66 where the New
York Court of Appeals broke the privity barrier, and held a manufac-
turer liable to the ultimate purchaser under negligence principles. The
MacPherson court's willingness to divert from the privity path was
analogous to the changing emphasis in tort theory. But more signifi-
cantly, this change was consistent with the more liberal attitude toward
the injured plaintiffs ability to recover from the manufacturing
enterprise.
The question, however, of imposing strict liability upon the manu-
facturer of an unreasonably dangerous product was not squarely ad-
dressed until 1944, when Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Id (footnotes omitted).
62. Id at 54. This idea is actually derived from an application of the landmark contract case
of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), to tort cases. Id The resulting
doctrine is that a business will be held to have assumed all those liabilities it should have antici-
pated at the time it engaged in that business activity. Id. This trend for imposing certain liabili-
ties as a cost of doing business is best exemplified by the area of workmen's compensation law,
wherein it can be said that:
A community which accepts the principle of [liability under workmen's compensation]
cannot be expected to find anything intrinsically unreasonable in the doctrine which
seeks to throw upon the undertaker the full responsibility for harm arising from his en-
terprise, on the theory that the business should bear its losses in the first instance regard-
less of fault or proximate cause, and that ultimately, like any other overhead charge, they
would fall on the consumer.
Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HARV. L. REV. 801, 802-03 (1916).
63. EHRENZWIEG, supra note 44, at 28 ("The development of tort law from rudimentary strict
liabilities and a general liability for negligence towards compensation and loss distribution can
perhaps be best observed in the changing pattern of the products liability of manufacturers and
other sellers.") (footnotes omitted).
64. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
65. In fact, Lord Albinger abhorred the prospect of straying from the privity concept, stating
that doing so would lead to "the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no
limit." Id at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
66. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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Court wrote his famous concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co. of Fresno.67 Subsequently, several commentators espoused
the virtues of the new theory and pressed for its adoption by the judici-
ary.68 California became the first state to subscribe to the new doctrine
in 1963 with the case of Greenman v; Yuba Power Products, Inc. 69
Moreover, the American Law Institute added increased credibility to
strict products liability when it adopted section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts.
70
The rationale for imposing strict liability upon the manufacturer
was grounded upon expressed public policy concerns that bore a strik-
ing resemblance to the two-fold thrust of enterprise liability-the man-
ufacturer's superior ability to effectively spread costs and prevent
risks.71 Specifically, "[iut is to the public interest to discourage the mar-
keting of products having defects that are a menace to the public.
72
Public policy demands that a fixed standard be imposed upon a manu-
facturer, one that will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market.73 Such a
demand was necessary because a consumer is not familiar with the
complex manufacturing processes used today and no longer has the
means or skill sufficient to investigate the soundness of a product.
74
For these reasons, "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
67. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944). The majority opinion never ad-
dressed any notions of strict products liability, but decided to impose liability based upon a less
sound res ipsa loquitur theory. Id at 457-61, 150 P.2d at 438-40. Justice Traynor, however, could
not subscribe to the majority's position and wrote a separate concurring opinion espousing the
virtues of strict products liability.
68. Eg., Prosser, Assault, supra note 35; Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drif Toward
Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963 (1957); James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be
Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957).
69. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
70. § 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
72. 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
73. Id
74. 24 Cal.2d at 467, 150 P.2d at 443.
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article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being. ' 75 These underlying public policies, so closely linked to
the foundation for the enterprise liability theory, became the basis for
the theory of strict products liability.
THE REFUSAL To RECOGNIZE POLICIES BEHIND STRICT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
The doctrine of strict products liability spread rapidly. In fact,
since the Greenman case, nearly forty additional American jurisdictions
have adopted the doctrine. 76 Such widespread acceptance is ample evi-
dence of society's concern for the injured consumer and the necessity of
enhancing the safety of industry's wares. 77 At any rate, it was inevita-
ble that the policies behind strict products liability would run against
the grain of the traditional corporate rule regarding successor liability.
As a result it is not surprising that there would be a dramatic increase
in the number of products liability cases that successor corporations
have been required to defend.
The expansion of the reach of products liability caused many
courts to confront the issue of a corporate successor's liability for the
defective products of its predecessor. The legal issue, in turn, was
whether the general rule, with its exceptions, should apply to the prod-
ucts liability plaintiff. More narrowly, the question was whether the
policies underlying strict products liability for defective products call
for a special exception to the traditional corporate rule that would
otherwise insulate the corporate successor from an injured party's
claim.78 This issue becomes more problematic when one considers that
the general rule of nonliability does not reflect the public policies un-
derpinning strict products liability.79 Furthermore, this conflict be-
comes even more pronounced in most cases because the selling
75. 59 Cal.2d at 62, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700, 377 P.2d at 900.
76. At the time this comment was being written, 40 jurisdictions, including the District of
Columbia, had adopted the concept of strict products liability either by statute or case decision.
HURSH & BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4.41 (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1981).
By contrast, only five jurisdictions seem to have rejected the strict products rule. See Ciociola v.
Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 53 Del. 477, 172 A.2d 252 (1961); Poppell v. Waters, 126 Ga.
App. 385, 190 S.E.2d 815 (1972); Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 378 N.E.2d 61
(1978); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 74 Mich. App. 532, 254 N.W.2d 569 (1977); Fowler v. General
Electric Co., 40 N.C. App. 301, 252 S.E.2d 862 (1979).
77. See A. WEINSTEIN, A TWERSRi, H. PIEHLER & W. DONAHER, FINAL REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: A STUDY OF THE INTERACTION OF
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 15 (1977).
78. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal.3d 22, 30, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579, 560 P.2d 3, 8 (1977).
79. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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corporation often dissolves shortly after the sale of its assets.80 There-
fore, the injured plaintiff has only one defendant from whom to seek
recovery, the successor corporation. When this cause of action is dis-
missed, the products liability plaintiff is effectively denied a remedy for
his injuries.
8'
Nevertheless, many courts continued to apply traditional corpo-
rate law in the products liability arena. In McKee v. Harris-Seybold
Co. ,82 a New Jersey Superior Court held that a successor corporation
could not be held responsible in strict liability for the injuries arising
from the defective products sold by its predecessor. 83 The court took a
very narrow approach in applying the exceptions to the general rule,
84
and was later criticized for taking such an approach.8 5
A California appellate court reached a similar conclusion in Ortiz
v. South BendLathe.86 However, the Ortiz court justified its holding by
suggesting that the plaintiff should attempt to recover from the direc-
tors and shareholders of the dissolved seller.87 The court went on to
say that the "lack of an available remedy against [the seller] would not
be grounds for shifting that liability to [the successor]."
88
The dissent in Ortiz was highly critical of the majority opinion and
80. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 Ill. App.3d 664, 666, 388 N.E.2d 778, 779
(1979) (original manufacturer dissolved approximately three years after corporate successor ulti-
mately gained control of the business operations); Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506
F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (predecessor dissolved 18 months
after transaction with successor); Gee v. Tenneco Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Upon
completion of the transfer of its asset to [the successor, the predecessor] changed its name. . . and
was subsequently dissolved").
81. See, e.g., Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App.3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975);
McKee v. Harris-Seybold, 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), aff'dper curiam, 188 N.J.
Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (1972); Bazan v. Kux Machine Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
82. 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), affdper curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d
585 (1972).
83. Id at 570, 264 A.2d at 106.
84. There were several factors that led the court to this conclusion: i. The purchase agree-
ment did not expressly contain an all-inclusive assumption of liabilities; 2. The transaction was
primarily a cash sale; 3. Both corporations were strangers before the sale and continued to remain
strangers after the sale; 4. The purchaser absorbed only the manufacturing operations of the seller,
not the entire entity; and 5. The seller continued to remain in existence for over a year after the
sale. Id at 563-71, 264 A.2d at 102-107.
85. Department of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 457, 419 A.2d 1151,
1156 (1980) (refers to McKee as a "harsh outcome"); Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super.
476, 486, 356 A.2d 458, 464 (1976) (indicates that the McKee decision represents an "extremely
limited viewpoint").
86. 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975).
87. Id at 849, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 560. The Ortiz court further justified its holding in a rather
ridiculous manner, merely stating that the injured plaintiff "is no worse off than if [the predeces-
sor] had gone bankrupt early in the game." Id Such a speculative argument by the court was
clearly not warranted.
88. Id
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argued that the consumer has a right to "reasonably expect a degree of
protection from the entity currently carrying on the business, even
though that entity may not be the one that originally manufactured and
marketed the particular item. '89 The dissent took an equally extreme
approach, stating that products liability "attaches to the business like
fleas to a dog, where it remains imbedded regardless of changes in own-
ership of the business." 90
Many courts have paralleled the approach of the Ortiz and McKee
decisions.91 Basically, the analysis is the same in every case: the opin-
ion will only acknowledge that the general rule of corporate nonliabil-
ity exists;92 the outcome will be a summary judgment in favor of the
defendant corporate successor.
93
AN EXPANDING APPLICATION OF THE EXCEPTIONS To THE
GENERAL RULE OF NONLIABILITY
Other courts have been able to give the narrow general rule of
nonliability a flexible interpretation, thus recognizing that the injured
products liability plaintiff may be without a remedy if he cannot seek
89. Id. at 850, 120 Cal. Rptr at 561. The dissenting judge's remarks on this matter come
inescapably close to a virtual restatement of the "consumer expectation theory" of defectiveness as
it applies to strict products liability actions. The basis for the theory appears in the Comments to
§ 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, wherein it is stated in pertinent part:
g. Defective condition. The rule stated in this section applies only where the product is,
at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him ....
i. Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this section applies only where the defec-
tive condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer. . . . [Wihat is meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section [is that the]
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments g & i (1965) (emphasis added). See also
Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 4024 and 402B." A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REV.
1185 (1976).
90. Id at 851, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 561. The dissenting judge went on to say that "[slo long as
the business retains its distinctive identity and character and continues to be operated as it has in
the past, defective product liability adheres to the business and remains there until discharged by
bankruptcy or comparable judicial act." Id
91. See Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Freeman v. White Way Sign &
Maintenance Co., 82 111. App. 3d 884, 403 N.E.2d 495 (1980); Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp.,
70 111. App. 3d 664, 388 N.E.2d 778 (1979); Jackson v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 166 N.J. Super.
448, 400 A.2d 81 (1979).
92. Two decisions have acknowledged the existence of expanding theories on successor liabil-
ity, but nevertheless rejected those theories. See Freeman v. White Way Sign & Maintenance Co.,
82 I11. App. 3d 884, 893-94, 403 N.E.2d 495, 502 (1980); Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 I11.
App. 3d 664, 667-70, 388 N.E.2d 778, 780-82 (1979).
93. Freeman v. White Way Sign & Maintenance Co., 82 I11. App. 3d 884, 403 N.E.2d 495
(1980), is an exception. There the court on appeal reversed a lower court decision against the
successor as a matter of law. Id. at 894, 403 N.E.2d at 502.
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recovery from the corporate successor. The first decision exhibiting
this flexibility was Cyr v. B. Offen & Co. 94 In Cyr the plaintiff was
injured in 1969 when he entered the ovens of a negligently designed
printing press which had been manufactured by B. Often & Company
in 1959. In 1962, the president and sole stockholder of the manufac-
turer died. The employees of that company eventually purchased the
business in 1963 and agreed to continue its operations exactly as
before.
95
The issue in Cyr was whether there was sufficient continuity be-
tween the predecessor and successor to warrant a conclusion that the
transaction fell into the "mere continuation" exception to the general
rule of nonliability.96 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. This ruling represented an ex-
pansion in the scope of successor liability, because previous courts had
required a continuity of ownership between the predecessor and succes-
sor to satisfy the mere continuation exception. 97 Obviously, no such
continuity of ownership existed under the Cyr facts because the selling
party had retained no interest in the corporation after the transaction
was completed. The Cyr court based its decision upon the notion that
"[t]he very existence of strict liability for manufacturers implies a basic
judgment that the hazards of predicting and insuring for risk from de-
fective products are better borne by the manufacturer than by the
consumer." 98
In this respect, the successor stands in a much better position than
the consumer to gauge the risks and the costs of meeting them.99 Even
though the successor was not the legal entity which placed the product
into the stream of commerce, it nevertheless was profiting from the ac-
cumulated goodwill which those products had earned.' °0 Therefore,
94. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
95. In fact, as one court has said of the transaction in the Cyr case, "Continuity was the
essence of the bargain." Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 488, 356 A.2d 458, 465
(1976).
96. See id at 488, 356 A.2d at 465. The Cyr court relied on the reasoning of two labor law
cases in determining whether there was sufficient continuity to warrant a conclusion that the trans-
action fulfilled the requirements of the mere continuation exception. See John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406
U.S. 272 (1972). See supra note 25 for a discussion of the mere continuation exception.
97. Eg., Ozan Lumber Co. v. Davis Sewing Mach. Co., 284 F. 161, 165 (D. Del. 1922);
McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), a9'd per curiam, 118 N.J.
Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (1972).
98. 501 F.2d at 1154.
99. Id The court indicated that the successor was in such a position because of its "experi-
ence and expertise." Id
100. Other courts have considered the fact that the successor profits from the goodwill of the
predecessor as a justification for imposing successor liability. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d
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the imposition of successor liability in this instance could not be char-
acterized as unfair. Moreover, the lack of continuity of ownership be-
tween predecessor and successor should not have precluded the
plaintiff from seeking recovery, especially since the entire business op-
eration was continual and without change.' 0 '
Several courts have followed the lead of the Cyr court in ex-
panding the scope of successor liability under a specific set of circum-
stances. In doing so, many decisions have pointed to additional
reasons calling for such an expansion. Some courts have said that the
imposition of products liability should not be dependent upon the form
of the transaction between two companies. 10 2 In addition, other courts
have observed that the successor corporation has received the benefits
of an ongoing concern, and thus should accept the burdens commensu-
rate with those benefits. 0 3 Therefore, the public policies underlying
strict products liability favor imposing responsibility upon the "enter-
prise," or going concern, which should bear the liability for damages
done by the defective products. 1' 4
BREAKING AWAY FROM THE CORPORATE TRADITION
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.
Within three years of the Cyr decision, two courts drastically
changed the emphasis in products liability cases involving corporate
successors. Both decisions generally recognized that the successor's lia-
bility stemming from defective products should be evaluated according
to principles underlying tort law, not corporate law.
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. ,105 the Michigan Supreme
22, 31, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 580, 560 P.2d 3, 9 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406,
425, 244 N.W.2d 873, 881 (1976).
101. 501 F.2d at 1154.
102. See Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) ("questions of an injured party's right to seek recovery are to be
resolved by an analysis of public policy considerations rather than by a mere procrustacean appli-
cation of formalities"); Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128, 133 (D.N.J. 1976)
("no corporation should be permitted to place into the stream of commerce a defective product
and avoid liability through corporate transformations or changes in form only."); Shannon v.
Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 803 (W.D. Mich. 1974) ("going concerns, should not be
permitted to discharge their liabilities to injured persons simply by shuffling paper and manipulat-
ing corporate entities").
103. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 803 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Wilson v.
Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super, 476, 356 A.2d 458 (1976); Department of Transp. v. PSC Re-
sources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 467, 419 A.2d 1151, 1162 (1980).
104. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D. Mich. 1974). See Depart-
ment of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 467, 419 A.2d 1151, 1162 (1980).
105. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
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Court reasoned that the responsibility for product-related injuries
should not be determined with reference to principles developed to
protect business creditors and minority shareholders. 06 In fact, such
principles were not a response to the needs of a products liability plain-
tiff' 0 7 who has the same legitimate concerns regardless of the formali-
ties of the acquisitions. 08 For this reason, in asset acquisitions, the
absence of commonality of ownership between transferee and trans-
feror would not, by itself, preclude the imposition of successor respon-
sibility for products liability claims. '0 9
The majority took into account the successor's ability to predict
and insure against the risks presented by the predecessor's defective
products, along with the benefits the successor gained from the good-
will developed by the predecessor."10 From this, the court determined
that the successor's responsibility hinged upon the "continuity of inter-
est" between the transferor and transferee.''' Thus, liability would be
imposed upon the successor if three elements were satisfied:
1. A continuity of the outward appearance of the enterprise, its
management, personnel, physical plant, assets, and business
operation.
2. The dissolution of the seller corporation as soon after the transfer
of assets as is legally and practically possible.
3. Assumption by the transferee of those liabilities and obligations
necessary to the uninterrupted continuation of normal business
operations. "12
Ray v. Alad Corp.
The Supreme Court of California in Ray v. Alad Corp. ,t13 com-
pletely abandoned the traditional test and approached the issue solely
in terms of the policies underpinning strict liability in tort and products
law.' 14 The court observed that although the corporate principles gov-
106. Id at 429-30, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84.
107. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
108. 397 Mich. at 418, 244 N.w.2d at 878.
109. Id at 422, 244 N.w.2d at 880.
110. Actually, this idea is not significantly different from the equitable concerns considered by
other courts in expanding successor liability within the parameters of the traditional corporate
rule. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
111. 397 Mich. at 429, 244 N.w.2d at 883. In this context, the court eliminated the require-
ment of a commonality of ownership between the successor and predecessor, stating that "the first,
third and fourth criteria quoted in Shannon from McKee as tests of continuity of interest, and
therefore responsibility, are all relevant, with the first perhaps of greatest significance." Id
112. The factors listed by the Turner court as being significant in actuality are no different
from the test employed in Cyr. See Note, Products Liability.- Developments In The Rule Of Succes-
sor Liability For Product-Related Injuries, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 338, 373 (1979).
113. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 136 Cal. Rptr. 572, 560 P.2d 3 (1977).
114. 19 Cal. 3d at 30-31, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80, 560 P.2d at 8-9.
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erning successor liability were not designed to address the special
problems involved in a products liability claim,"1-5 the public policies
flowing from strict products liability would justify imposing liability
upon the successor for three reasons. First, the plaintiffs remedies
against the original manufacturer are virtually destroyed by the succes-
sor's acquisition of the business." l 6 Second, the successor has the abil-
ity to assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading role."
7
Finally, successor responsibility is a burden which equitably attaches
itself to the original manufacturer's goodwill which has inured to the
successor's continued operation of the business." 8
The court's analysis of the relevant policies and justifications led to
the articulation of what is now known as the "product line excep-
tion." 1" 9 As the court noted:
We therefore conclude that a party which acquires a manufacturing
business and continues the output of its line of products under the
circumstances here presented assumes strict tort liability for defects
in units of the same product line previously manufactured and dis-
tributed by the entity from which the business was acquired.
120
Few courts have subscribed to the reasoning and judgment of
either the Turner or Alad approaches. 121 In fact, in at least one instance
there has been marked criticism of such an expansion. 22 Of course,
115. The court indicated that the plaintiff would be entirely precluded from recovering against
the successor under general rules of successor liability. 19 Cal. 3d at 28, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578, 560
P.2d at 7. The court concluded that a "special rule should be applicable to a successor corpora-
tion's tort liability for its predecessor's defective products. " Id at 8 (emphasis in original).
116. 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580, 560 P.2d at 9.
117. This is because of the fact that the seller invariably dissolves not long after the sale is
completed, thus causing potential legitimate claimants to "face formidable and probably insupera-
ble obstacles in attempting to obtain satisfaction of the judgment from former stockholders or
directors [of the predecessor]." 19 Cal. 3d at 32, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580, 560 P.2d at 9. See also
supra note 80 and accompanying text.
118. This justification is actually not a new one and has been used before to support the ex-
pansion of successor liability. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974) ("in
the most real sense [the successor] is profiting from exploiting all of the accumulated good will
which the products have earned").
119. It is interesting to note that the California Supreme Court did not attach such a label to
the new principle it had created, However, other courts have referred to the new rule in this
manner. See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977) ("product line the-
ory"); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 273, 408 A.2d 818, 824 (1979), afd, 86
N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981) ("product line exception").
120. 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582, 560 P.2d at 11 (overruling "[a]nything to the
contrary in Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe," 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975)).
121. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 408 A.2d 818 (1979), at'd, 86
N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981) (adopting the Alad rule); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th
Cir. 1980) (adopting Alad); Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(adopting Turner); Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979)
(combining principles of both Turner and Alad).
122. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440-41 (7th Cir. 1977); Travis v. Harris
Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
such criticism typically arises where courts have broken new ground
with the law.' 2 3 Nevertheless, the pendulum continues to swing in
favor of plaintiffs in products liability cases. The question is open as to
how far the pendulum will continue in the same direction.
RAMIREZ v AMSTED INDUSTRIES, INC. 1
24
Statement of the Case
On August 18, 1975, Efrain Ramirez was injured while operating
an allegedly defective power press on the premises of his employer.
25
The machine had been manufactured by Johnson Machine and Press
Company 26 sometime in 1948 or 1949. Johnson, however, had trans-
ferred all of its assets and liabilities to the Bontrager Construction
Company in 1956.127 Thereafter, Johnson transacted no business as a
manufacturing entity. 28 Bontrager then undertook the primary activ-
ity of producing the Johnson line of presses. By August of 1962, the
Johnson Company was subjected to yet another corporate transforma-
tion. Amsted Industries, Inc. purchased all of the assets of Bontrager,
including all of the Johnson assets that Bontrager had acquired in
1956.129 Also included in the purchase was the "exclusive right to
adopt and use the trade name 'Johnson Machine and Press
Corporation.' "130
The 1962 agreement provided that Amsted would assume certain
debts and liabilities in order to continue the operation of Bontrager's
business without interruption. 13 However, it was clear from the agree-
123. See, e.g., In Re Lyra Shipping Co., 360 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (E.D. La. 1973) (criticizing
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928)); Franks v. Nat'l Dairy Prods.
Corp., 282 F. Supp. 528, 533 (W.D. Tex. 1968) (criticizing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963)); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash.
2d 145, 147-48, 542 P.2d 774, 776 (1975) (en banc) (criticizing Greenman v. Yuba).
124. 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (198 1). The companion case of Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp.
was decided in the same manner as Ramirez. See 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981).
125. The plaintiff's employer was Zamax Manufacturing Co. of Belleville, New Jersey.
126. Hereinafter Johnson.
127. The Bontrager construction company was an Indiana Corporation [hereinafter
Bontrager].
128. 86 N.J. at 337, 431 A.2d at 814. Bontrager did retain a single share of Johnson common
stock so as to continue the Johnson name in corporate form. Id at 338, 431 A.2d at 814.
129. The Johnson assets included the single share of Johnson common stock. Id Further-
more, it appears that Bontrager dissolved shortly after this transaction was completed. See
Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136, 144 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Ortiz v. South Bend
Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 846, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558 (1975).
130. 86 N.J. at 338, 431 A.2d at 814.
131. However, the agreement also contained the following clause: "It is understood and
agreed that Purchaser shall not assume or be liable for any liability or obligations other than those
herein expressly assumed by Purchaser; all other liabilities and obligations of Seller shall be paid,
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ment that Amsted expressly declined to assume liability for any claims
arising from defective products manufactured by its predecessors.'
32
Amsted then continued to manufacture the Johnson presses 133 and was
assigned the single outstanding share of Johnson common stock previ-
ously held by Bontrager as of 1956. The corporate existence of John-
son was then dissolved in July, 1965.134
Ramirez filed a suit against Amsted as a successor corporation to
Johnson, seeking to recover damages on theories of negligence, breach
of warranty, and strict products liability for defective design and manu-
facturing. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of
Amsted and held, according to the appellate court, that "there is no
assumption of liability when the successor purchases the predecessor's
assets for cash and when the provisions of the purchase agreement be-
tween the selling and purchasing corporations indicate an intention to
limit the purchaser's assumption of liability.1
35
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court reversed the trial court,
holding that when a successor corporation purchases substantially all
of the assets of the predecessor corporation and continues essentially
the same manufacturing operation as the predecessor, the successor re-
mains liable for the product liability claims of its predecessor. 136 In so
holding, the court recognized the recent trend towards a rule imposing
liability on the successor without regard to the form of acquisition.
137
The court stated that the public policies behind the doctrine of strict
products liability should not allow a corporation to exculpate itself
from legitimate claims through the use of disclaimers.'
38
performed and discharged by Seller." 86 N.J. at 338, 431 A.2d at 814 (quoting from the 1962
agreement between Amsted and Bontrager).
132. Id. at 339, 431 A.2d at 814.
133. Amsted's wholly owned subsidiary, South Bend Lathe, Inc., manufactured the Johnson
line at the original Johnson plant in Elkhart, Indiana. Id
134. Amsted continued to manufacture Johnson presses until 1975, when the business was
sold to a newly formed corporation also named South Bend Lathe, Inc. As part of this agreement
Amsted agreed to indemnify South Bend Lathe, Inc. for any losses arising out of defects in ma-
chines manufactured prior to the closing date. Id. at 815.
135. 86 N.J. at 336, 431 A.2d at 813.
136. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 171 N.J. Super, 261, 278, 408 A.2d 818, 827 (1979).
137. Id at 269-70, 408 A.2d at 823, citing Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal.3d 22, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574,
560 P.2d 3 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.w.2d 873 (1976); Cyr v.
B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506
F.2d 361, 371 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
138. The Superior Court concluded that to preclude recovery based upon any such disclaimers
would be "wholly anachronistic in the context of the development of our product liability law."
171 N.J. Super. at 276, 408 A.2d at 826. However, before reaching this conclusion the court first
analyzed many of the earlier decisions calling for the expansion of successor liability along with
the public policy justifications for expanding the doctrine. Id at 269-74, 408 A.2d at 823-26.
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The Ramirez Opinion
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
plaintiff should not be precluded from recovery based upon traditional
principles of successor liability. 39 A thorough analysis of case law re-
vealed that the narrow approach employed in McKee v. Harris-Seybold
Co. 140 was inconsistent with the developing principles of strict products
liability.' 4 ' Indeed, the exceptions to the general rule had not been
meaningful to the injured plaintiff. 42 The court also noted that several
decisions had expanded successor liability.' 43 The bases for such an
expansion were the public policy considerations relied on by previous
courts. 144
After deciding to apply tort rather than corporate principles to
products liability plaintiffs, the court then considered whether it should
adopt the modem approach of either Turner or Alad. In doing so, the
Ramirez court called attention to the fact that the public policies un-
derlying strict products liability played an entirely different role in both
landmark decisions. In Turner, these public policies merely acted as a
justification for broadening the scope of traditional corporate successor
liability. 145 On the other hand, in A/ad, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia utilized the underlying public policies to justify creating an entirely
new rule of successor accountability in products cases. Furthermore,
139. Justice Clifford authored the opinion of the court.
140. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the McKee
approach.
141. 86 N.J. at 342-43, 431 A.2d at 816.
142. Id, quoting the Turner court's language wherein it stated:
To the injured persons the problem of recovery is substantially the same, no matter what
corporate process led to transfer of the first corporation and/or its assets. Whether the
corporate transaction was (1) a traditional merger accompanied by exchange of stock of
the two corporations, or (2) a de facto merger brought about by the purchase of one
corporation's assets by part of the stock of the second, or (3) a purchase of corporate
assets for cash, the injured person has the same problem, so long as the first corporation
in each case legally and/or practically becomes defunct. He has no place to turn for
relief except to the second corporation. Therefore, as to the injured person, distinctions
between types of corporate transfers are wholly unmeaningful.
397 Mich. 406, 419, 244 N.W.2d 873, 878. Indeed, a similar concern has been expressed elsewhere.
See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 31-33, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-81, 560 P.2d at 9-10.
143. 86 N.J. at 343, 431 A.2d at 817, citing as examples: Knapp v. North American Rockwell
Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501
F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974);
Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976); Department of Transp. v.
PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (1974); Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140
N.J. Super. 476, 356 A.2d 458 (1976).
144. See 86 N.J. at 343-45, 431 A.2d at 817.
145. Id at 347, 431 A.2d at 818-19. See also Comment, Extension of Strict Tort Liability to
Successor Corporations, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 595, 607-14 (1978), where the author considered Tur-
ner to be merely an expansion of traditional corporate principles andAlad a separate tort concept
of liability.
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the court observed that the focus in A/ad was entirely on the continued
manufacture of the product causing injury. 146  This approach was
much more consistent than the Turner court's focus upon the continua-
tion of the actual manufacturing operation.147 Because subsequent ap-
plications of the Turner approach had yielded contradictory results,
these considerations necessitated the adoption by the court of Alad's
product line approach.
The defendant had put forward three logical arguments against
the imposition of successor liability. First, such an expansion of succes-
sor responsibility would necessarily have a crippling effect on the abil-
ity of the small manufacturer to transfer ownership of its business
assets. 48 Business planners would be hesitant to purchase a business
with unpredictable contingent liabilities, thus forcing the small busi-
nessman into liquidation proceedings. 149 The court did not make short
shrift of this argument, and, in fact, admitted that the defendant's con-
cerns were entirely legitimate. However, the social policy underlying
products liability mandated that the true worth of a selling corporation
should reflect the potential liability for product defects.150 This respon-
sibility is a cost of doing business which has been created by social
policy.' 5
Second, it had been asserted that it would be unfair to impose lia-
bility upon a successor with twice removed status and where the prede-
cessor had placed the product in the stream of commerce twenty-eight
years before the injury occurred. The court's response to this conten-
tion was simply that these questions were matters of repose, and appro-
146. See supra text accompanying note 120.
147. 86 N.J. at 347-48, 431 A.2d at 819. Indeed, as the court illustrated, an application of the
Turner criteria has led to contradictory results under two identical fact patterns. See id. at 348,
431 A.2d at 819 n.3. Compare Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 I11. App. 3d 664, 388 N.E.2d
778 (1979) with Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979). See also
Note, Products Liability: Developments in the Rule of Successor Liability for Product-Related Inju-
ries, 12 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 338, 380-87 (1979).
148. 86 N.J. at 353, 431 A.2d at 822.
149. The court explained that business planners will be reluctant to purchase a "potential can
of worms" that would explode into an astronomical number of products liability claims. This
would drive down the purchase price of the small manufacturer's business. 86 N.J. at 353, 431
A.2d at 822. The price will be much less than the true worth of the manufacturer's business assets,
thus forcing him to liquidate rather than sell the business to a larger corporation. Id.
150. Id at 353-54, 431 A.2d at 822.
151. The court added that "[i]n addition to making adjustments to the purchase price, thereby
spreading the potential costs of liability between predecessor and successor corporations, it can
obtain products liability insurance for contingent liability claims, and it can enter into full or
partial indemnification or escrow agreements with the selling corporation." Id at 354, 431 A.2d at
822-23.
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priately a task for the legislature. 152
Finally, Amsted had argued that such a new standard of liability
should be applied prospectively.15 3 This contention hinged upon the
fact that its business planners had relied on the existing state of the law
in entering into the transaction with Bontrager in 1962.' 54 Further-
more, insurers had relied on the existing law in calculating the degree
of risk involved when determining premiums and providing coverage.
The court agreed that there may have been a reasonable basis for
such reliance, but stated that the plaintiffs in the present case should
not be denied the reward for the effort and expense involved in success-
fully challenging the traditional rule. Furthermore, the new rule was
also held to apply to products liability plaintiffs similarly situated, in
suits against successor manufacturers affected by this rule. These af-
fected cases must have been in progress as of November 15, 1979, the
date of the Appellate Division decision. 155 The decision was given such
an effect because the law recognized that certain persons who have ex-
ercised the initiative to challenge the existing law should not be barred
from recovery if their claims have not yet been resolved when the new
152. At this time, the court drew analogy to a New Jersey statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-
I. 1, which the court said
provides that no action for an injury arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of
an improvement to real property shall be brought against any person performing or fur-
nishing the design or construction of such improvement more than ten years after the
performance or furnishing of such services and construction.
86 N.J. at 355, 43 1 A.2d at 823. Stated very simply, the statute cited was a "statute of repose," a
legislative enactment intended to "cut back on the potential of [construction companies] to be
subject to liability for life." Id at 356, 431 A.2d at 824, quoting Hudson County v. Terminal
Constr. Corp., 154 N.J. Super, 264, 268, 381 A.2d 355, 357 (1977). From this, the court reasoned
that "[w]ith the expanded potential liability of successor corporations for injuries arising out of
defects in their predecessors' products, a similar legislative response may be in order with respect
to product liability claims." Id (footnote omitted).
153. 86 N.J. at 356-57, 431 A.2d 824. The defendant relied upon Darrow v. Hanover Townshi,
58 N.J. 410, 278 A.2d 200 (1971), where the New Jersey Supreme Court prospectively applied its
holding in immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970), abrogating the rule of interspousal
immunity in automobile negligence cases. 1miner was given a prospective application because the
defendants had established justifiable reliance upon earlier decisions upholding interspousal im-
munity. 58 N.J. at 418-20, 278 A.2d at 204-05.
154. "Reliance" is only one of many factors considered by courts to determine whether a
decision will be given a prospective or retrospective application. For a discussion of all of the
factors a court considers in determining whether to give a decision a retroactive effect, see Com-
ment, Legal Method--Deciding The Retroactive Effect of Overruling Decisions-Lau v. Nelson, 92
Wn. 2d 823, 601 P.2d 527 (1979), 55 WASH. L. REV. 833 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Legal
Method].
155. It is important to remember here that the decision of the Appellate Court essentially
adopted the "product line approach" of the Supreme Court of California in A/ad See supra notes
81-91 and accompanying text. Thus, the appellate decision presumably put all prospective de-
fendants on notice of the possibility of a forthcoming change in New Jersey law regarding corpo-
rate successor liability. See 86 N.J. at 357, 431 A.2d at 824.
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rule of law is announced. 56 Furthermore, successor manufacturers
would be liable only for those injuries arising after November 15, 1979.
The Concurring Opinion
The concurring opinion of Justice Schreiber disagreed with the
majority only as to the retrospective application of the decision. 5 7 The
Justice observed that it was inequitable to saddle previous purchasers
of assets with liabilities they have not assumed simply because the in-
jury occurred after November 15, 1979. Furthermore, the defendant in
this case had not placed the defective product into the stream of com-
merce. Amsted had neither contributed to the accident nor had been
responsible for the product when the purchase contract was made.
158
Moreover, the defendant had contracted in good faith, relying
upon the law that it would not be responsible for the seller's defective
products. Contingent liabilities, such as those arising from the seller's
defective products, had not been taken into consideration by Amsted
when calculating the contract purchase price. 159 In this respect, the de-
fendant was being subjected to a double burden. First, the purchaser
had paid more than it would have had it been aware of its liability for
the predecessor's manufacturing enterprise. It had also been deprived
of any opportunity to contractually provide for indemnification from
the seller, or for some other protective device, such as an escrow that
would have covered contingent product liabilities. 60  In addition, Jus-
156. The court went on to say that "[tihis is not unfair to defendants in similar asset-acquisi-
tion transactions who, except for the handful of cases caught up by the limited retroactive applica-
tion of today's rule, now have a 'cut-off' date of November 15, 1979 for exposure to liability." Id.
157. Id. at 358-61, 431 A.2d at 825-26 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
158. This line of argument appears to be accusing the majority of giving legal effect to part of
an agreement that had no legal effect when the agreement was entered into. However, this argu-
ment is, in essence, a contract argument that would be inappropriate in this case, because the
majority's decision was based upon tort principles.
159. In fact, Justice Schreiber reminded the court that it had recognized this fact. 86 N.J. at
359-60, 431 A.2d at 825. See also id. at 353-54, 431 A.2d at 822.
160. This argument appears to be very persuasive. On the one hand,
it is clear that once corporations considering such transactions become aware of the pos-
sibility of successor products liability, they can make suitable preparations [to account
for such liability]. Whether this takes the form of products liability insurance, indemnifi-
cation agreements or of escrow accounts, or even a deduction from the purchase price is
a matter to be considered between the [successor and predecessor].
Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 428, 244 N.W.2d at 883. On the other hand, it is also
clear that Amsted Industries is being unfairly subjected to a new rule of law which had not been
the law of the state of New Jersey. Nevertheless, as the Turner court noted:
While the first such successor to be faced with such a liability may claim surprise, the
claim lacks legal force. For this kind of surprise is endemic in a system where legal
principles are applied case by case and is no more an injustice than was the retroactive
application of the strict liability doctrine in Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H.
248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970).
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tice Schreiber examined statistics which indicated that it is questionable
whether purchasers can realistically acquire insurance to protect
against those liabilities.' 61 Finally, the dissent was concerned that the
plaintiff would, in reality, not be left completely without a remedy; var-
ious monetary sources may have still been available for
compensation. 
62
In the final analysis, the concurring opinion would have respected
the contracts of those parties who had entered into a corporate transfer
agreement on or before November 15, 1979. Therefore, an equitable
resolution would have been to focus on the date of acquisition. Only
those purchasers who had entered into contracts after November 15,
1979 should have been subjected to the new rule.
ANALYSIS
The Ramirez court placed considerable emphasis upon the public
policies underlying strict products law as a justification for the expan-
sion of tort liability to the corporate successor. 163 Although the special
interests underlying the traditional corporate rules were to be given
some weight, those interests were superceded by the necessity of pro-
Id, quoting Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d at 1154.
161. 86 N.J. at 360, 431 A.2d at 826. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 28TH
ANNUAL REP., ch. 18, IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ON SMALL BUSINESS 167-71, S. REP. No.
629, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Dept. of Commerce, Interagency Task Force on Product Liability:
FINAL REPORT at VI-2 to VI-38 (1977); Products Liability Insurance.- Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Capital, Investment and Business of the House Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Part I) 4 (1977). See also Kadens, Practitioner's Guide to Treatment of Seller's Products
Liabilities in Assets Acquisitions, 10 U. TOL. L. REV, 1, 22-25 (1978); Note, Products Liability and
Successor Corporations.- Protecting the Product User and the Small Manufacturer Through In-
creasedAvailability of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1000, 1002-04, 1022-24
(1980).
162. As the concurring opinion stated, "the injured persons may not have been left totally
unrecompensed. Worker's compensation, accident and health insurance policies, and liability of
the manufacturer of the defective product or its insurer are some monetary sources which may be
available to compensate the injured plaintiff." 86 N.J. at 361, 431 A.2d at 826.
163. The court specifically referred to this "public policy" when it said:
In our view these policy considerations likewise justify the imposition of potential strict
tort liability [upon the successor corporation] under the circumstances here presented.
.. the imposition of successor corporation liability upon Amsted is consistent with the
publicpolicy of spreading the risk to society at large for the cost of injuries from defective
products.
86 N.J. at 349-50, 431 A.2d at 820 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Ramirez court also utilized
the liberalization of tort law principles as further justification for the expansion of corporate suc-
cessor liability, and stated that:
The progressive character of New Jersey decisional law in the area of strict products
liability is well known. ...
Id at 350, 431 A.2d at 820.
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viding for the needs of the injured plaintiff.164 To be more specific, the
court in Ramirez was willing to impose strict products liability upon the
corporate successor because of its abilility to function as the best "risk
preventer" and the "cheapest cost avoider."' 165 Ironically, these consid-
erations are virtually identical to the two-pronged foundation for enter-
prise liability. 166 In fact, the Ramirez court went so far as to say, in
effect, that strict products liability is "enterprise liability." 167 The court
went even further, when it based the successor's liability so/ely upon its
function as the most effective cost spreader. This can be deduced from
the simple fact that the successor could not have been in a position to
prevent the risk of harm presented by the predecessor's defective prod-
ucts. t 68 At any rate, the adoption of the "product line exception" first
espoused in Ray v. Alad Corp. 169 would be in the name of public policy.
However, the expansion of corporate successor liability in such a
manner is not entirely new. The Ramirez opinion is not a significant
one because of its expansion of products liability for public policy rea-
sons-this had been done in the past. 70 Rather, Ramirez is important
because it addressed three novel issues regarding the imposition of cor-
porate successor liability. Two of these issues, which essentially fo-
cused on the fairness of imposing liability under these facts, were raised
by Amsted. The first argument made was that the imposition of liabil-
ity would have a crippling effect upon the ability of the small manufac-
turer to transfer ownership of its business.171 It was also argued that it
would be unfair to impose liability because the product was placed into
the stream of commerce nearly three decades before the injury and be-
164. The court's emphasis upon this notion was fairly self-evident:
The [corporate successor's] contentions raise legitimate concerns. We do not look upon
them as "cassandrian arguments."
H .. owever, these concerns, genuine as they may be, cannot be permitted to over-
shadow the basic social policy, now so well-entrenched in our jurisprudence, that favors
imposition of the costs of injuries from defective products on the manufacturing enter-
prise and consuming public rather than on the innocent injured party.
Id at 353-54, 431 A.2d at 822-23.
165. Id at 350-51, 431 A.2d at 821-22.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 54 & 55.
167. 86 N.J. at 351, 431 A.2d at 821 ("Strict liability for injuries caused by defective products
placed into the stream of commerce is 'an enterprise liability.' ").
168. Since the corporate successor in Ramirez was not even in existence at the time the defec-
tive product was produced, it certainly could not have been in a position to prevent the defect in
the Johnson press, and thus, the risk of harm presented by that defect.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 81-91.
170. Public policy is the very basis of the doctrine of strict products liability. See supra text
accompanying notes 67-75.
171. It is interesting to note that Amsted offered no explanation as to why this effect was, in a
broad sense, a negative by-product of the court's decision. Perhaps the defendant was hoping the
Ramirez court would come to the rescue of the small businessman in this case.
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cause Amsted was the second successor of Johnson.172 The third issue,
whether to give the decision a retroactive effect, was essentially ad-
dressed by the court on its own volition.
73
The Crippling Effect Upon Business
The court was very candid in its approach to the defendant's argu-
ment that corporate successor responsibility for defective products
would have a crippling effect upon business interests. Indeed, Amsted
had raised legitimate, if not pressing, concerns. The court expressly
contradicted other authorities that had dismissed this contention as be-
ing far too speculative to address. 174 Nevertheless, the policies underly-
ing strict products liability required that the true value of a corporation
reflect potential liability for defective products. Thus, it is likely that a
large manufacturer would be unwilling to purchase a smaller manufac-
turer's business because the potential successor liability for defective
products may be far too great. This possibility may force the smaller
manufacturer to liquidate because he is too small to cover the potential
products liability claims himself. The force of social policy dictates,
however, that this result is a necessary cost of doing business.
The court need not have pressed this issue any further. The public
policies calling for successor responsibility under these circumstances
were sufficiently compelling to justify the decision. 75 For some reason,
however, the court needed to inject the notion of fairness with respect
to this issue, perhaps because it did not want its decision to be charac-
172. Basically, this argument translates into the contention that it is unfair to impose liability
upon a corporate successor with "twice removed status." Amsted had been the unsuccessful pro-
ponent of this argument in an earlier case where it was contesting the imposition of corporate
successor liability. See Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979). In
Korzetz, the court's response to this argument was equally as negative as that given in Ramirez:
Amsted's twice removed status (vis-a-vis Johnson) does not appear to be legally signifi-
cant. Amsted continued the business that Johnson established. That fact was in no way
negated by Bontrager "picking up the ball" from Johnson and then "passing it" to
Amsted.
ld at 144-45.
173. The retroactivity of a decision will basically have an effect upon two groups of litigants,
those who are parties to the litigation giving rise to the new rule, and those future litigants whose
past conduct will be subject to the scrutiny of the new rule. See Traynor, supra note 10, at 264-70.
Of course, the overruling court cannot avoid deciding whether the parties to the suit will be pre-
vailed upon to follow the new rule. Such a decision is not volitional. However, the court's decla-
ration of the effect of a new rule upon future litigants is merely dictum. See id at 269-70; Legal
Method, supra note 154, at 846-47 (1980).
174. It has been said that this claim is frivolous; one that argues fictions that simply do not
exist. See Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 428-29, 244 N.W.2d at 883; Juenger &
Schulman, Assets Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 39, 57 (1975).
175. Indeed, this legal proposition was the thread that held together the forceful reasoning of
the court inRay . A/lad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 136 Cal. Rptr. 572, 560 P.2d 3 (1977).
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terized as "anti-business."'' 76
At any rate, the opinion suggested that the defendant could have
protected itself against these liabilities either by obtaining products lia-
bility insurance or through the use of full or partial indemnity or es-
crow agreements. This assertion with respect to insurance flew in the
face of overwhelming contrary authority presented in the concurring
opinion. The unfortunate reality of the situation is that the small
manufacturer cannot protect itself with insurance coverage in this
area.' 77  Furthermore, the court has the benefit of hindsight to intro-
duce the point that an escrow agreement would have protected Amsted.
The court neglected to mention that when the contract between Bon-
trager and Amsted was entered into, Amsted lawfully exculpated itself
from liability for its predecessor's defects. For this reason, it would
have been utterly ridiculous for Amsted to require Bontrager to place
funds in escrow as a security to cover for liability arising from defective
products manufactured prior to the closing. Bontrager had already
agreed to assume these liabilities.
The core of the court's basis for this conclusion hits the proverbial
nail on the head. Strict products liability carries with it certain strong
public policies. Among these policies are: the virtual destruction of the
injured plaintiff's remedies against the original manufacturer caused by
the transfer of business; the successor's ability to spread the cost of inju-
ries; and the fairness of requiring the successor corporation to assume
the predecessor's responsibility for the defective products sold.
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These policies outweigh the interests of business and justify the succes-
sor's assumption of the predecessor's liability.179
176. A consideration of this nature is not as novel as it appears at first glance. For example,
the dissenter in a critical Illinois Supreme Court decision regarding the expansion of the tort of
retaliatory discharge, recently stated that:
The deteriorating business climate in this State is a topic of substantial interest. A gen-
eral discussion of that subject is not appropriate to this dissent. It must be acknowl-
edged, however, that Illinois is not attracting a great amount of new industry and
business and that industries are leaving the State at a troublesome rate. I do not believe
that this court should further contribute to the declining business environment by creat-
ing a vague concept of public policy ...
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 143, 421 N.E.2d 876, 885 (1981) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
177. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
178. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus. Inc., 86 N.J. at 349-50, 431 A.2d at 820; Ray v. Alad Corp., 19
Cal. 3d at 31, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580, 560 P.2d at 9.
179. The product line approach of A/ad and Ramirez has been recently criticized in Nguyen v.
Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 433 N.E.2d 1104 (1982). In Nguyen, the
court indicated that the "product line approach" could not be accepted because it created liability
without duty. Id at 1147, 433 N.E.2d at 1109. This characterization of A/ad and Ramirez is, at
the very least, absolutely incorrect. The product line approach does not create liability in the




Amsted made a very strong argument with regard to the manifest
unfairness of imposing liability for defects in a product that was manu-
factured twenty-eight years before the injury occurred. However, the
court correctly refused to create an absolute twenty-eight-year limita-
tion cutting off the manufacturer's liability. Any hard-and-fast time
bar is a matter of repose, very similar in character to a statute of limita-
tions.' 80 Such time bar limitations are matters appropriately within the
purview of the legislature.'
8 '
Moreover, it should be noted that Amsted was not precluded from
making this argument at trial on the merits. Amsted should, and in-
deed probably will, argue at trial that the machine press involved in
this incident had exceeded its "protracted safe use." 82 A manufacturer
mag strict products liability as the reason for holding that the corporate successor assumes the
predecessor's liability for injuries caused by defective products. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d
at 31-34, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580-82, 560 P.2d at 9-1I; Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. at 349-
53, 431 A.2d at 820-22.
Furthermore, Nguyen, as well as other Illinois Appellate Court decisions that have rejected
the product line approach, conducts an oversimplified analysis of the public policies underlying
strict products liability. See, e.g., Freeman v. White Way Sign & Maintenance Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d
884, 403 N.E.2d 495 (1980); Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 I11. App. 3d 664, 388 N.E.2d
778 (1979). Hopefully, a more thorough analysis can be done in the future, to give the basis of the
product line approach the attention it is entitled.
180. Statutes of repose are sometimes enacted by state legislatures and are based upon the
notion "that no one can make products that last forever, and that after a product had had time to
wear out, the manufacturer should not be liable. Thus, the goal is to shield manufacturers from
claims arising many years after the product enters the market." Note, Product Liability Reform
Proposals In Washington-A Public Policy Analysis, 4 U.P.S. L. REV. 143, 168 (1980) (footnotes
omitted). Typically, "[a] statute of repose is a fixed limitation period running from the date of
manufacture or the date of entry of the product into the market, whereas a statute of limitations
requires the plaintiff to initiate suit within a given period after the claim accrued." Id at 167-68
(footnotes omitted). See also Phillips, An Analysis ofProposed Reform of Products Liability Stat-
utes ofLimitations, 56 N.C.L. REV. 663 (1978).
181. As the Appellate Court in Ramirez pointed out, approximately seventeen states have al-
ready adopted statutes of repose which operate as a time bar limitation relating to product liability
claims. 171 N.J. Super. 261, 277 n.2, 408 A.2d 818, 827 n.2 (1979).
182. The "protracted safe use" of a product is sometimes referred to as the "prolonged safe
use." See Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1958). This concept, very
simply stated, means that "[tihere is no duty upon a manufacturer to furnish a machine that will
not wear out." Auld v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 261 App. Div. 918, 918, 25 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493
(1981), aff'dper curiam, 288 N.Y. 515, 41 N.E.2d 927 (1942), and is based upon Prosser's com-
ments that:
If the chattel is in good condition when it is sold, the seller is not responsible when it
undergoes subsequent changes, or wears out. The more lapse of time since the sale by
the defendant, during which there has been continued safe use of the product, is always
relevant, as indicating that the seller was not responsible for the defect. There have been
occasional cases in which, upon the particular facts, it has been held to be conclusive. It
is, however, quite certain that neither long continued lapse of time nor changes in owner-
ship will be sufficient in themselves to defeat recovery when there is clear evidence of an
original defect in the thing sold.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 96 (3d ed. 1964) (footnotes omitted). Thus,
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is not liable for injuries caused by a defective product that has exceeded
its protracted safe use. Therefore, although the defendant's argument
may not lack merit, it is being raised at an inappropriate stage of the
litigation. 183
Retroactive Decision-making
The Ramirez court met the defendant's reliance contentions head-
on. Even though there may have been reasonable, even justifiable, reli-
ance by Amsted on the existing status of the law, it would not be
enough to deny the plaintiff his right to recover against the successor
corporation. The court's resolution of this matter was clearly war-
ranted in light of the policies underlying strict products liability. The
public policies were much too strong to justify a contrary ruling.
By far the most unusual aspect of Ramirez was the manner in
which the court gave its ruling a retroactive effect.' 84 The decision was
to be applied retroactively in two ways. First, the holding would apply
to those cases challenging the traditional rule which were also in pro-
gress as of the date of the superior court's decision. 8 -5 Second, the deci-
sion was held to cover any injuries arising out of previously defectively
manufactured products, if the accident occurred after the above date.
Essentially, the court was treating its holding as if it had been handed
down on the same date as the Appellate Division's decision and ap-
plied prospectively therefrom. Such an application is highly unusual
and deserves some explanation.
186
the "prolonged use of a manufactured article is but one factor, albeit an important one, in the
determination of the factual issue whether the negligent manufacture proximately caused the
harm." Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1958). See also Mickle v.
Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 237-38, 166 S.E.2d 173, 187 (1969).
183. The Ramirez court seems to have considered both Amsted's "twice removed status" as
well as the 28 year time span to fall within the category of a "repose matter." This is apparent
from the court's failure to scrutinize each of these factors separately. See 86 N.J. at 355, 431 A.2d
at 823.
184. See supra note 135 for a discussion of the types of litigants that can be affected by a
retroactive decision. The Ramirez decision was retroactively applied to both future litigants and
to the parties to the litigation. See infra text accompanying notes 182-83. See also 86 N.J. at 357,
431 A.2d at 824.
185. November 15, 1979.
186. There are basically four ways in which a court will apply an overruling decision:
1. purely prospectively, giving the new rule effect in future cases only;
2. partially retroactively, giving the new rule effect on the parties to the overruling
decision and on future cases only;
3. generally retroactively, giving the new rule effect on all cases not barred by statutes
of limitations or jurisdictional rules for timely appeal;
4. retroactively as in (3) above, but not allowing the rule to govern cases terminated by
judgment or verdict before the filing of the overruling decision.
Legal Method, supra note 154, at 835. See also Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371, 1397 (1966). The Rami-
rez decision appears to be a hybrid of either category number three or four.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The court obviously was impressed with the unfairness of the
traditional rule with respect to products liability claims. Products lia-
bility plaintiffs have been denied a remedy far too long. The tradi-
tional rule had developed totally without reference to products liability
law. Moreover, the public policies underlying strict products liability
were not without force. These policies clearly reflected society's man-
date that the injured party should never have been denied this cause of
action, at least since the introduction of the concept of strict products
liability.' 87 Therefore, it would appear that if this decision were given
a full retroactive effect, it would only be defeated by New Jersey's stat-
ute of limitations. 8
8
However, the court did not overzealously approach these outer
bounds on the issue of retroactivity. 8 9 Perhaps the court was once
again concerned with the prospect of being characterized as "anti-busi-
ness." At any rate, it is fair to infer that the court tried to strike a
balance between the legitimate interests of business and the over-
whelming public policies in favor of the products liability plaintiff.
Thus, the court reached a sort of "middle ground" between these com-
peting concerns and arrived at the November 15, 1979 cutoff date.
Since this was the date of the Appellate Court decision, no business
would be heard to say that it was not aware of the change in New
Jersey law. Under these circumstances, and according to the court's
reasoning, successor corporations had been given considerable time to
obtain insurance to cover these "contingent liabilities."'
190
The concurring opinion raised important equitable considerations
in regard to retroactivity. In response to these considerations, Justice
Schreiber suggested that the court respect those contracts entered into
187. In a similar manner the New Jersey Supreme Court reflected society's changing demands
long ago in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 380, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960),
wherein the court stated:
where the commodities sold are such that if defectively manufactured they will be dan-
gerous to life or limb, then society's interests can only be protected by eliminating the
requirement of privity between the maker and his dealers and the reasonably expected
ultimate consumer. In that way the burden of losses consequent upon use of defective
articles is borne by those who are in position to either control the danger or make an
equitable distribution of the losses when they do occur.
188. New Jersey has a two year statute of limitations for all personal injury actions. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952).
189. Justice Traynor reflected that appellate judges have sometimes acted overzealously as
"champions of supposed good causes." At the time he warned that in overruling case precedent
judges should act cautiously and that the common law should change and develop at the "pace of
a tortoise." See Traynor, supra note 10, at 263-64, 276.
190. Although, as noted previously, the small businessman does not, in reality, have the op-
portunity to protect himself against these contingent liabilities. See supra note 161 and accompa-
nying text.
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before November 15, 1979. This suggestion contradicted the basic
holding in Ramirez. The responsibility of a corporate successor for the
defective products of its predecessor is based upon tort law, not con-
tract law. For this reason, the contracts between the two corporations
should have had no impact upon whether successor liability was ex-
panded. In the same manner, these contracts should not have had an
effect upon the retroactivity of the decision. Furthermore, to adopt the
concurring opinion's approach could lead to outrageous results. For
example, it is conceivable that a plaintiff could be injured by a prede-
cessor's defective product twenty or even fifty years from now. 191 Yet,
this same plaintiff would be barred from recovery because the successor
entered into a purchase contract with his predecessor prior to Novem-
ber 15, 1979. Such a result would be manifestly inconsistent with the
Ramirez holding.
RETROACTIVE DECISION-MAKING: AN APPROPRIATE VEHICLE IN
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
The opinion in Ramirez carefully analyzed the public policies un-
derlying strict products liability. This analysis proved fruitful, as the
court had a wealth of legal ammunition to effect a retroactive ruling.
As a result, the justifications employed by the court do not seem
strained or lacking in merit. The court has broken new ground, and
has done so cautiously. 92 The Ramirez decision adds sweeping
changes in the law of successor liability, but these changes have not
gone too far. 19
3
The retroactive application of the new rule in Ramirez is entirely
consistent with the court's ultimate conclusion. Courts often consider
several factors in determining whether to apply a new rule retroac-
tively.' 94 The most important consideration is whether the purpose of
the rule would be furthered by the retroactive application of a decision.
As Justice Traynor has said:
It would be better to keep the focus on the purpose of the new rule in
analyzing the issue of retroactivity. . . . The most rational determi-
nant for not only the issue of retroactivity, but its radius as well, is
thus the purpose of the new rule. A determinant of such powerful
191. This consideration carries even more weight in light of the fact that New Jersey's legisla-
ture has not enacted a statute of repose.
192. See Traynor, supra note 10, at 262-64, 276-79, for a discussion of the rationale behind the
necessary caution judges should exercise in overruling case precedent.
193. This consideration is especially true in Ramirez, for "[it is one thing to announce a
sweeping new rule, and quite another to sweep clean with it." Id at 282.
194. See Legal Method, supra note 154, at 838-43.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
relevance should stand preeminent, well apart from peripheral
factors. 195
Given the importance of the purpose of the new rule, it is clear
that the Ramirez decision was correctly applied in a retroactive fashion.
The purpose of strict products liability
"is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective prod-
ucts are borne by the manufacturers . . . rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves." However, the rule
"does not rest on the analysis of the financial strength or bargaining
power of the parties to the particular action. It rests, rather on the
proposition that "[T]he cost of an injury. . . may be an overwhelm-
ing misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among
the public as a cost of doing business." Thus, "the paramount policy
to be promoted by the rule is the protection of otherwise defenseless
victims from manufacturing defects and the spreading throughout so-
ciety of the cost of compensating them."' 96
A retroactive decision in this case, without question, furthers the
purpose of compensating injured parties since it attempts to reach as
many potential plaintiffs as is possible. Furthermore, the manufac-
turer's ability to absorb costs and spread them throughout society is a
major premise of the concept of strict liability. A retroactive ruling
furthers the purpose of spreading those costs instead of pinning them
upon the defenseless and sometimes penniless victim. For these rea-
sons, the retroactive decision in Ramirez was more than completely
justified.
The Ramirez decision will undoubtedly have a favorable impact
on the credibility of the product line approach in Ray v. Alad Corp. 197
Along these lines, a shadow of doubt has been cast upon the "mere
continuation" approach in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. 198 Far
more importantly, Ramirez was a rigorous exercise in judicial decision-
making that could, perhaps, add vitality to retroactive overruling in the
products area. Furthermore, the court addressed certain issues in re-
gard to successor liability that had not been examined before. In this
respect, the decision has undoubtedly made the prospect of "change" in
corporate successor liability less difficult or drastic.
195. Traynor, supra note 10, at 279.
196. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 30-31, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579, 560 P.2d at 8 (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 113-23.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 105-12.
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CONCLUSION
The Ramirez court joined ranks with a number of other courts rec-
ognizing that the traditional rule of corporate successor liability is in-
herently unfair to products liability plaintiffs. The old rule, although it
was an accurate response to business concerns, is not responsive to the
policies underlying strict liability. For this reason, the court felt that
successor accountability should be dealt with in an entirely different
manner, independent of corporate law. The foundation should be one
in tort law, and the focus should be on the product. Specifically, the
Ramirez decision adopted the "product line exception" and rejected
the "mere continuation" approach of Turner.
In addition, the court in Ramirez endeavored to respond to some
very difficult questions that go with such an abrupt change in the law.
The court was not persuaded by claims of unfairness to small busi-
nesses, nor was it persuaded by arguments that are appropriately made
on the merits of the case. Perhaps most significantly, the Ramirez court
molded its decision in a retrospective fashion to further the purposes of
strict products liability. In this respect, the decision was an edifying
example of retroactive judicial decisionmaking, one that will undoubt-
edly be looked upon favorably and followed by many courts.
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